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Abstract 
Monitoring the restrictiveness of regulations governing the retail companies may help to 
induce a positive dynamic leading to more open and competitive retail markets in the EU. 
The Commission services have developed for the first time the monitoring framework for 
the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator, which is made of 14 types of restrictions, two sub-
pillars, two pillars and one overall index across the 28 EU Member States. This exercise 
inevitably entails both conceptual and practical challenges. The statistical audit discussed 
in this note was conducted by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), 
and it aims at maximising the reliability and transparency of the Retail Restrictiveness 
Indicator framework (1). It should enable policy analysts and researchers alike to draw 
more relevant, meaningful and useful conclusions from the results presented in the Staff 
Working Document accompanying the Commission Communication A European retail 
sector fit for the 21st century.  
Prior to undertaking this statistical assessment, the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator 
development team and the JRC engaged in previous discussions during fall 2017 and 
early 2018, whereby earlier versions of the framework were assessed by the JRC. 
Preliminary JRC suggestions were taken into account for the final computation of the 
Retail Restrictiveness Indicator and its underlying components. 
The present statistical assessment of the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator focuses on two 
main aspects: 
 The statistical coherence of the indicator framework, and;
 The impact of key modelling assumptions on the overall scores and ranks.
This JRC analysis complements the reported Retail Restrictiveness Indicator results for 
the EU Member States – namely those for the two main pillars, the Establishment 
restrictions and Operations restrictions - with estimated confidence intervals, in order to 
better appreciate the robustness of the results to key modelling choices (such as choice 
of the weights and the aggregation formula).  
(1) The JRC statistical audit  is based on the recommendations of the OECD & JRC (2008) Handbook on 
Composite Indicators, and on more recent research from the JRC (Saisana and Saltelli, 2011; Saisana et 
al., 2005, Saisana et al., 2011). Generally, JRC audits of composite indicators and scoreboards are 
conducted upon request of their developers, see https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/coin and https://composite-
indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
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1 Construction of the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator 
The making of the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator (RRI) is described in more detail in the 
Staff Working Document accompanying the Commission Communication A European 
retail sector fit for the 21st century. Nevertheless, a brief description of the framework is 
helpful to put this statistical audit in context and to allow the present note to be read 
independently if necessary. 
The Commission services developed the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator with a view to 
measure the degree of restrictiveness of restrictions imposed on the retail sector across 
the EU. The indicator is meant to constitute a factual overview of restrictions in Member 
States. The development of the RRI conceptual framework benefitted from input received 
from retailers, competent authorities, trade unions and citizens during the Commission’s 
open public consultation (17 July to 8 October 2017). Member States were consulted 
through meetings of the Services Directive Expert Group. The RRI framework has also 
benefitted from original desk-based research of the Commission services who conducted 
thorough analysis of reports published by international agencies and organisations on 
retail restrictions and country level original legislation.  
As a result, the conceptual framework covers retail-specific restrictions stemming from 
regulations put in place in the EU Member States by competent authorities and not 
restrictions created by the behaviour of private operators. Also, the framework takes into 
account regulations going beyond harmonized EU legislation and not on measures 
adopted by Member States to implement EU legislation. The RRI conceptual framework, 
expressed in its main Index, two pillars (one of them split in two sub-pillars) and 14 
carefully selected categories of restrictions affecting the retailing industry, is shown in 
Table 1. 
Overall, the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator covers two major facets of the sector, 
namely: 
 ‘Retail establishment restrictions’ that may significantly affect the possibility to
open a shop or hinder the development of specific business models or store formats.
These restrictions include specific requirements depending on the retail outlet size,
regulations specific to the city centre or periphery, requirements for economic data,
level of detail in the use of commercial surfaces defined in the local plans, permits
required on planning, building, environmental, special retail authorisation, number of
administrative entities a retailer needs to contact in an establishment procedure,
number of market studies/impact assessments that the entrants are obliged to
submit, length of the procedure to obtain a decision to establish a shop, and whether
positive and negative authorisation decisions are published.
 ‘Retail operations restrictions’ that may have a negative impact on the daily
operations of retail companies and affect their efficiency, productivity and the quality
and price of products offered. These are restrictions on weekdays openings and
Sunday trading/opening, regulations which restrict the distribution channels for
selling non-prescription medicines, alcohol and tobacco to end-consumers (2),
regulations which limit retailers' freedom to decide on and conduct promotional
activities for their shops (inter alia regulations regarding end-of-season or end-of-
business sales), regulations imposing specific taxes and fees on the retail sector (i.e.
taxes and fees exclusively levied on retailers), and regulations or practices which limit
directly retailers' possibilities for sourcing products (e.g. regulations indicating that a
certain share of products must be sourced nationally or within a local supply chain).
The RRI framework is much broader than other relevant frameworks, such the OECD 
Product Market Regulation (OECD, 2003, 2006, 2009), and it is more EU-focused in 
(2) The indicator is meant to constitute a factual overview of restrictions in Member States. Rules on distribution 
channels for specific products, such as alcohol, tobacco and non-prescription medicines are included for the 
sake of completeness of the restrictiveness picture. This is without prejudice to the health and societal policy 
objectives pursued by Member States. 
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capturing the complexity and diversity of the regulatory frameworks in place in the EU 
Member States. The information behind the overall RRI scores and the values for 
particular indicators can help to evidence best practices in the EU and identify areas 
where countries could still improve. The subsequent versions of the RRI will allow 
monitoring of the developments over time and are expected to induce a positive dynamic 
leading to more open and competitive retail markets. 
 
Table 1. Retail Restrictiveness Indicator: conceptual framework 
 
Notes: Expert-based weights for the indicators and the main components are shown in parenthesis.  
Source: adjusted from European Commission, SWD(2018) 236. 
 
Overall 14 types of retail-specific restrictions (indicators) have been selected by the 
Commission services to populate this framework. Some of these indicators are of a more 
quantifiable nature (e.g. “number of market studies and impact assessments that 
entrants are obliged to submit”), while others require an expert judgement (e.g. 
"location-specific rules"). The original sources of data for each indicator are all referenced 
in detail in the Staff Working Document. This transparency and detail in the source 
information lends considerable credibility to the RRI and opens the data for use by policy 
analysts and researchers alike.  
The RRI dataset is 100% complete across the 14 indicators and the 28 EU Member 
States. All indicators are calculated based on a scoring method, where the maximum 
possible score is six (most restrictive), and the minimum possible is zero (least 
restrictive) (see SWD/2018/236 for more details). Every aggregate measure is then 
calculated as the weighted arithmetic average of the underlying components (weights are 
shown in Table 1). The weights attached to the various RRI components have been 
derived based on expert judgement and on regression analysis with relevant economic 
variables, such as birth rates of retail companies, price level indices, market concertation 
indices and other. Consequently, within the retail establishment pillar, the part covering 
conditions related to opening a shop is given more importance (55%), as compared to 
the part capturing procedures related to establishment (45%). Finally, in the overall RRI 
composite indicator, the part of the indicator covering issues linked to retail 
establishment (opening of new outlets) has been given a higher importance (60 %), as 
compared to the part reflecting restrictions to operations (40 %).  
Index Pillar Sub-pillar KPI Retail-specific restrictions (indicators)
1 Size thresholds (20%)
2 Location-specific rules (10%)
3 Economic data requirements (15%)
4 Level of detail in local plans (10%)
5 Number of permits (10%)
6 Number of entities to contact (10%)
7 Number of impact assessments (10%)
8 Length of procedure (10%)
9 Publication of decisions (5%)
10 Shop opening hours (20%)
11 Distribution channels for specific products (20%)
12 Sales promotions (20%)
13 Retail-specific taxes and fees (20%)
14 Sourcing of products (20%)
1: Retail 
Establishment 
restrictions 
(60%)
Conditions 
(55%)
Procedures 
(45%)
2: Retail 
Operations 
restrictions 
(40%)
Retail 
Restrictiveness 
Indicator
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2 Data analysis and statistical coherence 
2.1 Exploring the data 
This section comprises an exploratory analysis of the dataset at the indicator level and 
helps to get a first grasp on the type of data that are further aggregated into the 
components of the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator.   
Figure 1.Number of unique values (and dotplots) for the RRI indicators 
 
 
Notes: Indicator names appear on Table 1. Dots (second and third panel) represent indicator scores of each of 
the 28 EU Member States.  
Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre, 2018.  
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Figure 1 evidences the “discrete nature” of the majority of the retail restrictiveness 
indicators. Five indicators are more continuous with close to 10 or more unique values 
across the 28 EU Member States: Size thresholds (#1), Length of procedure (#8), Shop 
opening hours (#10), Distribution channels for specific products (#11) and Sales 
promotions (#12). On the other hand, nine indicators have only a small number of 
unique values. For example, Location-specific rules (#2) and Economic data 
requirements (#3) take zero value in half of the countries in the EU and are at the 
maximum level of restrictions (=6) for the other half. More peculiar appear to be the 
indicators on Retail-specific taxes and fees (#13) and Sourcing of products (#14) that 
are zero (least restrictive) for 25 and 27 countries, respectively. 
2.2. First statistical coherence test for the RRI framework 
The statistical coherence of the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator is a necessary, though not 
necessarily sufficient, condition for a sound framework. Given that the present statistical 
analysis of the RRI framework will mostly, though not exclusively, be based on 
correlations, the correspondence of the RRI framework to a real-world phenomenon 
needs to be critically addressed because ‘correlations need not necessarily represent the 
real influence of the individual indicators on the phenomenon being measured’ (OECD & 
EC JRC, 2008). 
The point is that the validity of the RRI framework relies on the combination of both 
statistical and conceptual soundness. In this respect, the RRI framework has been 
developed following an iterative process that went back and forth between the theoretical 
understanding of retail-specific restrictions within the EU on the one hand, and data 
observations on the other.  
A positive outcome of the first coherence test between the RRI conceptual framework 
and the underlying data comes from an analysis of the correlation structure within and 
across the two main pillars, the Establishment restrictions and the Operations 
restrictions. The correlation coefficients within a sub-pillar or pillar are positive and 
sufficiently strong in most cases. Table 2 presents the results of this first statistical 
coherence test. 
More specifically, the Conditions sub-pillar of the Retail Establishment restrictions is a 
good summary measure of all four underlying indicators, namely size thresholds, 
location-specific rules, economic data requirements, and level of detail in local plans. 
Similarly, the Procedures sub-pillar is influenced by four out of the five indicators; the 
publication of decisions being not statistically associated to the sub-pillar (using p=0.01 
as a threshold for statistical significance). Interestingly, whilst the indicator on the 
number of impact assessments belongs to the Procedures-type of restrictions in retail 
establishment, it is found to have strong association also to the Conditions-type of 
restrictions. This link of the number of impact assessments and market studies to both 
conditions and procedures related to the establishment of a shop may be worth of further 
analysis. 
The Retail establishment restrictions pillar is influenced by five out of the nine indicators. 
The most influential indicators are the location specific rules, followed by the number of 
impact assessments and the economic data requirements. Instead, the four indicators 
that seem to have negligible impact in determining country variations in the Retail 
establishment restrictions pillar are: level of detail in local plans, number of entities to 
contact, length of procedure and publication of decisions. These indicators would have 
been “lost in aggregation” should the RRI framework not have included the two sub-
pillars. Instead, they are influential at least at the sub-pillar level. This result confirms 
the choice of the developers to include two sub-pillars under the Retail establishment 
restrictions in order to maintain the information content of those indicators at least at 
one aggregation level. The relevant SWD(2018)236 offers in fact additional insights on 
the conditions and procedures related to the retail establishment restrictions. This type of 
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information would have otherwise gone unnoticed had the aggregation been done directly 
from the nine indicators to the (establishment) pillar.  
The second pillar of the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator, the Operations restrictions pillar, 
is influenced by three out of the five indicators, all of them bearing a similar impact to 
the pillar: shop opening hours, sales promotions and retail-specific taxes and fees. 
Instead, the two indicators that seem to have negligible impact in determining country 
variations in the retail operations are distribution channels for specific products and 
sourcing of products.   
 
Table 2. First statistical coherence test: associations between the RRI components 
 
Notes: Numbers represent Kendall-tau rank correlation coefficients between the RRI components and the 
underlying indicators (for 28 countries). Given the type of data (see Figure 1), Kendall’s rank correlation 
coefficients have been used as statistical measure to detect ordinal relationships between indicators and the 
RRI components. Correlations that are not significant at the 1% level are left blank. Grey boxes show 
conceptual grouping of the indicators.   
Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre, 2018.  
 
2.3. Second statistical coherence test for the RRI framework 
Although conceptually enriching the overall RRI framework, six indicators were found not 
to co-vary with the respective pillars, as a result of the first statistical coherence test. 
These are four indicators related to establishment restrictions ‒ level of detail in local 
plans, number of entities to contact, length of procedure, publication of decisions ‒ and 
two indicators related to the operations restrictions, namely distribution channels for 
specific products, sourcing of products. This means that high levels of restriction on those 
indicators can be associated with either high or low values in the respective pillars and 
the same holds for low pillar scores.  
To gain further insights as to whether these six types of restrictions are influential for at 
least some of the EU Member States, we tested how the country ordering changes when 
these indicators are eliminated one-at-a-time from the respective pillar. Table 3 presents 
the results of the second statistical coherence test, whereby the six types of restrictions 
that were found not to pass the first coherence test are excluded one-at-a-time. In the 
retail establishment restrictions pillar, excluding either the number of entities to contact 
or the publication decisions would have modest impact on the country ordering. Instead, 
Belgium and Poland would gain 5 and 4 positions respectively - assessed as “less 
restrictive”-  if the restrictions on the level of detail in local plans are excluded from the 
RRI framework. On the other hand, France would gain 6 positions if the length of 
procedure is excluded from the RRI framework. In the retail operations pillar, excluding 
Pillar Sub-pillar Retail-specific restrictions (indicators) Retail 
Establishment 
restrictions
Retail Operations 
restrictions
Conditions Procedures
Size thresholds 0.55 0.42 0.54 0.12
Location-specific rules 0.68 0.36 0.69 0.02
Economic data requirements 0.70 0.29 0.66 -0.22
Level of detail in local plans 0.41 0.11 0.29 0.18
Number of permits 0.23 0.54 0.38 0.14
Number of entities to contact 0.18 0.56 0.35 0.26
Number of impact assessments 0.61 0.60 0.68 0.12
Length of procedure 0.13 0.47 0.28 0.40
Publication of decisions 0.07 0.18 0.14 0.01
Shop opening hours 0.18 0.29 0.24 0.47
Distribution channels for specific products -0.19 -0.09 -0.14 0.22
Sales promotions -0.13 0.27 -0.02 0.46
Retail-specific taxes and fees -0.14 0.28 0.00 0.42
Sourcing of products -0.20 -0.03 -0.15 0.23
2: Retail 
Operations 
restrictions
Retail Establishment 
restrictions
1: Retail 
Establishment 
restrictions
Conditions
Procedures
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the distribution channels for specific products would have a noteworthy impact on eight 
of the 28 EU Member States. In this case, Finland would gain the most, moving from the 
middle of the scale to being one of the top three least restrictive countries in the EU on 
retail establishment. On the other hand, Croatia and the United Kingdom would move by 
eight positions down and appear as more restrictive than currently. Excluding the 
sourcing of products would favour only Romania, which would gain 9 positions and move 
from being one of the top three most restrictive countries on retail operations to the 
middle of the scale.  
 
Table 3. Second statistical coherence test: excluding one-at-a-time selected types of 
restrictions 
 
Notes: The six types of restrictions that were found not to pass the first statistical coherence test are included 
in this analysis. Numbers represent shifts in rank in either the Establishment or the Operations pillar when an 
indicator is excluded from the framework. Positive shifts imply improvement in a country’s position (less 
restrictive); negative shifts imply deterioration in a country’s position (more restrictive). Shifts equal to 4 
positions or greater are highlighted. 
Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre, 2018.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level of detail 
in local plans
Number of 
entities to 
contact
Length of 
procedure
Publication 
decisions
Distribution 
channels for 
specific products
Sourcing of 
products
Italy 0 0 0 0 France 0 0
Luxembourg 2 0 0 0 Spain 2 0
Cyprus -1 3 0 1 Romania 0 9
United Kingdom -1 -1 3 -1 Austria 2 -1
Ireland 0 0 -1 0 Portugal -3 -1
Denmark 2 -2 -1 0 Belgium -1 -1
Germany 0 0 -1 0 Cyprus 1 -1
Malta -2 0 0 0 Luxembourg 3 -1
Spain 0 0 0 1 Germany 0 -1
Netherlands 0 0 0 -1 Greece -3 -1
Sweden 0 0 0 0 Malta 2 -1
Slovenia 2 3 0 2 Italy 2 -1
Belgium 5 -1 1 -1 Poland -3 0
Austria -2 -1 1 1 Finland 12 0
Hungary -2 -1 -2 -2 Czech Republic 5 0
Portugal -1 2 0 0 Netherlands -4 0
France -1 3 6 0 Slovenia 4 0
Finland -1 -2 -1 1 Latvia 0 0
Greece 1 -2 0 -1 Bulgaria 0 0
Croatia -1 -1 -2 2 Lithuania 6 0
Poland 4 1 -1 -1 Slovakia 0 0
Romania -1 3 -1 1 Denmark -4 0
Lithuania 4 3 -1 -2 United Kingdom -8 0
Czech Republic -2 -3 1 0 Croatia -8 0
Bulgaria -2 -2 3 0 Sweden -1 0
Slovakia -2 -2 -2 0 Hungary -1 0
Latvia -1 0 -1 0 Estonia -1 0
Estonia 0 0 -1 0 Ireland -3 0
3 6 3 0 13 1
Retail operations restrictions pillar 
without:
Number of countries shifting 3 positions or more
Retail establishment restrictions pillar 
without:
Most 
restrictive
Least 
restrictive
Most 
restrictive
Least 
restrictive
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2.4 JRC recommendations based on two statistical coherence tests 
Overall, the results of the two statistical coherence tests discussed above (correlation 
analysis and impact of excluding an indicator one-at-a-time) suggest that the conceptual 
grouping of indicators into two sub-pillars and two pillars is statistically confirmed, and 
that the two RRI pillars are in general influenced by most underlying indicators. Twelve 
out of the 14 types of restrictions in the RRI framework are influential. 
Nevertheless, the tests helped to single out two types of restrictions that appear to have 
a modest impact on the country ordering, namely Publication decisions related to the 
retail establishment and Sourcing of products. The JRC recommendation for the next 
year’s release of the RRI is to carefully revise and/or reconsider the inclusion of these 
two types of restrictions – Publication decisions and Sourcing of products – and 
eventually replace them with other types of restrictions that may be more relevant for 
more EU countries. 
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3 Retail restrictions for establishment and operations: two 
concepts one number? 
 
An overall score on the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator for each EU Member State may 
better advocate for the need to remove unnecessary restrictions towards more open and 
competitive retail markets in the EU. In order to arrive at a single retail restrictiveness 
score for each country, it is necessary to aggregate the country scores obtained for the 
two pillars, establishment restrictions and operations restrictions. The decision about how 
to aggregate together the pillars may have a significant impact on the final results. Like 
any other methodological decision, it should be made given a full understanding of the 
implications of alternative methodologies and how this relates to the concepts that are 
meant to be conveyed. 
The RRI is calculated as the weighted arithmetic average of the two pillars: the Retail 
Establishment pillar is assigned a nominal weight of 60%, and the Retail Operations pillar 
a weight of 40%. The main underlying assumptions in the linear formula used for 
aggregation are twofold. For one thing, low scores in one of the pillars can be fully 
compensated with higher scores in the other. For another thing, the higher weight 
assigned to the Establishment pillar in the formula reflects the idea of that pillar being 
more “important” to assess the overall restrictiveness in the retail sector in any given 
country. However, the assumption of higher weights reflecting higher importance in the 
composite needs to be tested on a case-by-case. In fact, whilst weights are often 
assigned to the components of an index to reflect the components’ effective importance 
in the index, in practice, the data correlation structure and the data variances do not 
always allow the weights assigned to the variables to match their importance (see Becker 
et al., 2017; Paruolo et al., 2013). 
To investigate empirically the relative influence on the RRI of both pillars, a suitable 
correlation measure is used for calculating the ‘implicit weights’. The implicit weights are 
calculated here with the squared Pearson correlation coefficient, otherwise known as the 
coefficient of determination, and rescaled to sum 100%. Table 4 confirms that 
restrictions on establishment are indeed more influential than restrictions on operations 
in determining variations in the RRI country scores. Yet, from a purely statistical 
perspective, the Establishment pillar has a much higher contribution to the RRI than what 
it would be expected by considering the expert-based weights. 
 
Table 4. Expert-based weights and importance measures for the RRI pillars  
 
Note: Pearson correlation is a suitable measure of the statistical association between the two pillars and the 
overall index given that all three components have continuous distributions. The ‘implicit weights’ are calculated 
as the squared Pearson correlation coefficients rescaled to 100% sum. Implicit weight for the retail 
establishment pillar = 0.8375/(0.8375+0.2063)=0.80; Implicit weight for the retail operations  pillar = 
0.2063/(0.8375+0.2063)=0.20. 
Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre, 2018.  
 
 
Retail Establishment 
restrictions (Pillar 1)
Retail Operations 
restrictions (Pillar 2)
Expert-based weights 60% 40%
Implicit weights 80% 20%
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A clear visual indication that the establishment restrictions dominate the RRI compared 
to the operations restrictions is given in Figure 2: it shows a strong linear relationship 
between the Establishment pillar and the RRI, against a weak and diffuse effect of the 
Operations pillar on the RRI. 
 
Figure 2. Retail Restrictiveness Indicator vs Establishment and Operations pillars 
 
Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre, 2018.  
 
Hence, when analysing the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator one should bear in mind that 
the overall index is more driven by the Establishment restrictions than by the Operations 
restrictions. Per se this is not a problem, because in fact the establishment restrictions 
seem to be more associated to relevant economic variables, such as birth rates of retail 
companies, price level indices, market concentration indices and other (see 
SWD/2018/236). 
The main challenge to combine the two retail restrictiveness pillars into a single number 
stems from the negligible association between these two components. The Pearson 
correlation coefficient between the two RRI pillars is only 0.056 (non signficant), which 
suggests that there is no pattern between these two major types of retail restrictions. 
This result is clearly visible in Figure 3, that shows a diffuse scatter of points 
corresponding to country performances in each of the pillars. The solid lines in the plot 
represent the median values of the scores in each pillar; the dashed lines represent the 
75th percentiles. For example, those countries close to or beyond the two dashed lines at 
the top right side in the Figure 3 (Spain, Cyprus, Germany and Luxembourg) may need 
to take action to eliminate unnecessary restrictions at both phases of establishing and 
operating a shop. On the other hand, countries located at the bottom left quadrant are 
those countries where most good practices for both establishment and operations 
restrictions are to be found.    
When it comes to measuring retail restrictions in the European Union, the random 
pattern between establishment and operations restrictions may be seen as reassuring. It 
suggests that on average countries that have higher levels of restrictions on 
establishment do not necessarily have high levels of operations restrictions. Yet, from a 
methodological point of view, this random association between the two main types of 
restrictions in the EU poses the challenges of aggregation that were discussed and 
illustrated in this section.  
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Figure 3. Retail Establishment restrictions vs Retail Operations restrictions in the EU 
 
Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre, 2018.  
 
Undoubtedly, the added value of monitoring retail operations restrictions is in putting the 
spotlight on some countries that may have gone unnoticed had only the retail 
establishment restrictions been considered. Figure 4 summarises the biggest differences 
in the country classification (shifts of 5 positions or more in absolute terms) between the 
Establishment pillar and the overall index, which stem from the impact of the operations 
restrictions. The most relevant cases are five: Spain, France, Romania, Sweden and 
Slovenia. For example, Romania would have been included in the top 10 less restrictive 
countries in the EU had only the retail establishment restrictions been considered, but 
due to restrictions on the operations-side of retail shops, Romania arrives in the middle 
of the overall scale in the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator. In the same vein, France falls 
from the middle of the overall scale to the 10 most restrictive countries due to strong 
restrictions on the operations side. On the other hand, Slovenia and Sweden appear to be 
in the middle of the overall scale, thanks to less restrictive regulations related to 
operations which compensate for more stringent restrictions when it comes to 
establishing a shop. In this light, the retail operations restrictions play an important role 
by singling out those countries that are worthy of further analysis. 
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Figure 4. Added value of the operations restrictions in the overall index 
Note: The graph presents the five countries with the biggest shifts (5 positions or more) between the overall 
classification and the restail establishment restrictions that are due to the operations restrictions. 
Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre, 2018.  
All in all, from a purely statistical perspective the JRC recommendation would be to put 
less emphasis on the overall restrictiveness index scores when it comes to analyzing 
policy implications. The Retail Restrictiveness Indicator may serve as advocacy tool, and 
help to put the spotlight on countries that may have less restrictions at the establishment 
phase but impose unnecessary restrictions during the operations stage (e.g. France, 
Spain and Romania) or countries that impose notable restrictions at the establishment 
phase but are much less restrictive when it comes to the operations phase (e.g. Sweden 
and Slovenia). The recommendation for the best strategy to be adopted in order to get 
an understanding of the restrictions in the retail sector across Member States would be to 
use the entire RRI framework of indicators and to guide policy recommendations based 
on the two main types of restrictions, the Establishment and the Operations. As 
discussed based on the statistical findings above, insights on the conditions and 
procedures for establishment would help to complement the picture.  
The findings in this section confirm that the strategy adopted in the SWD for 
communicating the results on the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator and its underlying 
components, is indeed the most suitable given the concept and the data at hand.  
Establishment
restrictions
Retail 
Restrictiveness
Indicator
Operations 
restrictions
28 France
27 Spain
26 Romania
25 Spain
24
23
22
21
20 Spain
19 France
18 Sweden
17 Slovenia
16
15
14 Romania
13 Sweden
12 France Slovenia Slovenia
11
10
9
8
7 Romania
6
5
4 Sweden
3
2
1
Most
Restrictive
Least
Restrictive
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4 Impact of modelling assumptions on the RRI results 
The analysis in this section addresses the following two key questions:  
(a) Does the use of one aggregation strategy versus another provide actually a partial 
picture of the countries’ degree of retail restrictions related to the establishment and the 
operations? 
(b) Which countries, if any, have large uncertainty bounds in their establishment and 
operations restrictions scores (volatile countries) as a result of altering the weights 
assigned to the indicators? 
4.1 Impact of the aggregation formula 
The main aim here is to understand the implications of alternative approaches to 
aggregate the restrictiveness indicators included in each of the two pillars. The current 
methodology of the index implies calculating the weighted average of the indicators 
included in each pillar. However, as a departure from the current methodology, non-
compensatory methods could also be used to aggregate the underlying indicators. Non-
compensatory methods are recommended for discrete and non-quantitative variables, 
such as those included in the retail restrictiveness dataset. These methods rely upon the 
ordinal information contained in the dataset to order the available alternatives 
(countries). No cardinal information is obtained as a result of the aggregation process, 
i.e. the final country ordering is not accompanied by country scores. Examples of non-
compensatory approaches include the Copeland rule and the Arrow-Raynaud algorithm 
(OECD/EC JRC, 2008; Munda, 2008). The Copeland rule has been proven to offer a good 
enough compromise between the efficiency of the algorithm used in the search for the 
optimal solution and its computational requirements. Accordingly, here we use the 
Copeland rule as an alternative to the standard arithmetic aggregation approach. 
Figure 5 plots the Establishment pillar ordering (left panel) and the Operations pillar 
ordering (right panel) resulting from the arithmetic average versus the country ordering 
obtained with the Copeland method. The solid line represents the hypothetical situation 
of no shifts (identical country ordering) under both aggregation methods. For the 
Establishment pillar, the Spearman rank correlation between the two orderings is 0.91. If 
we subtract this value from 1, we can obtain a loose measure of the “upheaval” of 
choosing a non-compensatory versus a compensatory approach: 0.09. However, despite 
the high degree of similarity between the two country orderings, the scatter in the plot is 
still significant for some countries. Six countries shift 5 positions or more depending on 
the aggregation formula used: Belgium, Croatia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovenia and 
Sweden. In the case of Sweden, the change in the aggregation methodology would imply 
an improvement of nine positions in the ordering (from the 18th to the 9th position). For 
the Operations pillar, as expected, the level of discrepancy or “upheaval” is higher than 
that in the first pillar (0.12, corresponding to a Spearman rank correlation value of 0.88). 
In total, nine countries experience shifts equal to or above five positions: Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland. The 
biggest impact is found for Poland, which would climb 9 positions had the Copeland rule 
been used. 
Overall, the choice of a non-compensatory versus a fully compensatory approach for 
aggregating the indicators within each RRI pillar would impact six countries in the case of 
the establishment restrictions and nine countries in the case of the operations 
restrictions. Yet, the high degree of association between the country orderings obtained 
using either the arithmetic average (baseline) versus a non-compensatory approach is 
reassuring. 
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Figure 5. Country ordering in the RRI pillars: average vs non-compensatory algorithm 
 
Notes: The Spearman rank correlation between the country orderings obtained using either the 
arithmetic average (baseline) versus a non-compensatory approach is 0.91 for the establishment 
pillar (left panel) and 0.88 for the operations pillar (right panel). 
Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre, 2018.  
 
4.2 Impact of the weighting scheme 
The analysis here aims at estimating the effect of varying the weights assigned to the 14 
types of restrictions inside plausible ranges. For that purpose, the weights originally 
assigned to each indicator in each pillar are subject to random shocks (+/- 25%), and 
subsequently scaled to add up to 1 within each pillar. The distribution of pillar scores 
over the 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations performed are presented in Figure 6 for the 
Establishment restrictions (left panel) and Operations restrictions (right panel). The 
height of the error bars in the plots represents the uncertainty in the country scores 
associated to the uncertainty in the weights. The dot represents the baseline score (as in 
the SWD) for each country across the simulations. 
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Figure 6. RRI pillars: baseline scores and simulated scores   
 
 
Notes: Uncertainty in the country scores for the Establishment restrictions (top panel) and for the Operations 
restrictions (bottom panel). Intervals (90% confidence intervals) are calculated over 1,000 simulated scenarios 
based on random weights (+/- 25% around the expert-based weights assigned to the restrictions, as shown in 
Table 1).  
Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre, 2018.  
 
Essentially, the magnitude of uncertainty in both pillars is modest. Altering the weights 
within reasonable limits (+/- 25% around the expert-based weights) implies a change in 
the country scores of less than plus/minus 0.2 points for the Establishment restrictions 
and less than 0.3 points for the Operations restrictions. For the sake of transparency and 
to better appreciate the robustness of the results, Table 5 reports the 90% intervals for 
the simulated scores together with the original (baseline) scores in the two Retail 
Restrictiveness pillars. 
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Table 5. Uncertainty in the weights: original pillar scores and confidence intervals 
 
Notes: Intervals (90% confidence intervals) are calculated over 1,000 simulated scenarios based on random 
weights (+/- 25% around the expert-based weights assigned to the restrictions, as shown in Table 1). 
Countries are ordered from the most restrictive to the least restrictive according to the Establishment pillar of 
the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator. 
Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre, 2018.  
Original 
score
Original 
score
Italy 4.5 [ 4.4 4.6 ] 1.3 [ 1.1 1.5 ]
Luxembourg 4.5 [ 4.4 4.6 ] 1.6 [ 1.4 1.8 ]
Cyprus 4.0 [ 3.8 4.1 ] 1.8 [ 1.5 2.1 ]
United Kingdom 3.9 [ 3.8 4.1 ] 0.7 [ 0.6 0.8 ]
Ireland 3.8 [ 3.6 4.0 ] 0.5 [ 0.4 0.6 ]
Denmark 3.7 [ 3.5 3.9 ] 0.7 [ 0.6 0.8 ]
Germany 3.5 [ 3.4 3.7 ] 1.6 [ 1.3 1.8 ]
Malta 3.3 [ 3.2 3.5 ] 1.3 [ 1.1 1.5 ]
Spain 3.3 [ 3.1 3.4 ] 2.8 [ 2.6 3.0 ]
Netherlands 3.1 [ 2.9 3.2 ] 0.9 [ 0.8 1.1 ]
Sweden 2.6 [ 2.4 2.7 ] 0.6 [ 0.5 0.7 ]
Slovenia 2.4 [ 2.3 2.6 ] 0.8 [ 0.7 1.0 ]
Belgium 2.4 [ 2.2 2.6 ] 2.1 [ 1.9 2.3 ]
Austria 2.3 [ 2.2 2.5 ] 2.3 [ 2.0 2.6 ]
Hungary 2.3 [ 2.1 2.5 ] 0.6 [ 0.5 0.7 ]
Portugal 2.0 [ 1.9 2.2 ] 2.2 [ 2.0 2.5 ]
France 1.8 [ 1.6 2.0 ] 3.4 [ 3.2 3.6 ]
Finland 1.8 [ 1.7 1.9 ] 1.1 [ 0.9 1.3 ]
Greece 1.7 [ 1.5 1.8 ] 1.5 [ 1.4 1.7 ]
Croatia 1.6 [ 1.5 1.8 ] 0.6 [ 0.6 0.7 ]
Poland 1.4 [ 1.3 1.5 ] 1.2 [ 1.0 1.4 ]
Romania 1.3 [ 1.2 1.4 ] 2.5 [ 2.3 2.7 ]
Lithuania 1.3 [ 1.2 1.4 ] 0.8 [ 0.6 1.0 ]
Czech Republic 1.3 [ 1.2 1.4 ] 1.0 [ 0.8 1.2 ]
Bulgaria 1.2 [ 1.1 1.3 ] 0.8 [ 0.7 1.0 ]
Slovakia 1.1 [ 1.1 1.2 ] 0.7 [ 0.6 0.9 ]
Latvia 1.0 [ 0.9 1.1 ] 0.8 [ 0.7 1.0 ]
Estonia 1.0 [ 0.9 1.1 ] 0.6 [ 0.5 0.7 ]
[Interval]
Retail establishment 
restrictions (Pillar 1)
Retail operations 
restrictions (Pillar 2)
[Interval]
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5 Conclusions 
The Commission services developed the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator with a view to 
measure the degree of restrictiveness of restrictions imposed on the retail sector across 
the EU. The JRC statistical audit has delved around in the workings of the Retail 
Restrictiveness Indicator (RRI) framework to assess the statistical properties of the data, 
and the methodology used in its construction. Overall the RRI framework is well-
constructed, into which a lot of thought has clearly been put. One of the greatest 
strengths is the amount of original research into retail restrictions in the EU and relevant 
survey data collected, as well as the transparency and detail of all data populating the 
RRI framework. This transparency and detail in the source information lends considerable 
credibility to the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator as an ensemble of information and opens 
the data for use by policy analysts and researchers alike. 
The key findings of the statistical assessment conducted herein are the following: 
First, two statistical coherence tests (correlation analysis and impact of excluding an 
indicator one-at-a-time) suggest that the conceptual grouping of the 14 types of 
restrictions into two sub-pillars (Conditions and Procedures under the Establishment 
pillar) and two pillars (Establishment and Operations) is statistically confirmed, and 
that the two main pillars are in general influenced by most underlying indicators. Twelve 
out of the 14 types of restrictions in the RRI framework are influential.  
Second, the inclusion of two sub-pillars under the Retail establishment 
restrictions pillar was confirmed as an important choice because it helps to pass the 
information content of three indicators to the next aggregation level. The three indicators 
‒ level of detail in local plans, number of entities to contact, length of procedure ‒ would 
have been “lost in the aggregation” should the RRI framework not have included the 
Conditions and Procedures sub-pillars.   
Third, although the indicator on the number of market studies and impact assessments 
belongs to the Procedures in retail establishment, it is found to have strong association 
also to the Conditions in retail establishment. This dual impact of the number of 
impact assessments and market studies to both conditions and procedures for 
establishment may be worth of further analysis. 
Forth, the tests helped to single out two types of restrictions that appear to have a 
modest impact on the country ordering, namely Publication decisions related to the retail 
establishment and Sourcing of products. The JRC recommendation for the future release 
of the RRI is to carefully revise the formulation of these types of restrictions and/or 
reconsider their inclusion, eventually replacing them with other types of restrictions that 
may be more relevant for more EU countries. 
Fifth, when analysing the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator one should bear in mind 
that the index is more driven by the Establishment restrictions (80%) than by the 
Operations restrictions (20%), although the weights assigned to the pillars are 60-40%. 
Per se this is not a problem, because in fact the establishment restrictions seem to be 
more associated to relevant economic variables, such as birth rates of retail companies, 
price level indices, market concertation indices and other (see SWD(2018)236).  
Sixth, the analysis evidenced that there is a random pattern between the two main 
pillars, the Establishment restrictions and the Operations restrictions. From a 
methodological point of view, this random association between the two main types of 
restrictions in the EU poses a challenge in their aggregation. Yet, from the retailing 
industry perspective it may be seen as reassuring. It suggests that on average 
countries that have higher levels of restrictions on establishment do not necessarily have 
high levels of operations restrictions. This random pattern between the two main pillars 
suggests that it is preferable to analyse the plot of the two pillars, which helps to 
evidence two groups of countries: those countries that may need to take action to 
eliminate unnecessary restrictions at both phases of establishing and operating a shop 
(Spain, Cyprus, Germany and Luxembourg) and those countries where most good 
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practices for low levels of retail restrictions at both the establishment and the operation 
phases are to be found (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovakia).    
Seventh, the analysis confirms that the strategy adopted in the SWD for 
communicating the results on the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator framework is indeed 
the most suitable given the concept and the data at hand. The SWD rightly places 
more emphasis and dedicates extended analyses and policy insights based on the two 
main types of restrictions, the Establishment and the Operations, and downplays the 
results on the single index. In any case, the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator may serve as 
advocacy tool for the need to remove unnecessary restrictions towards more open and 
competitive retail markets in the EU. The index can also help to put the spotlight on 
countries that may have less restrictions at the establishment phase but impose 
unnecessary restrictions during the operations stage (e.g. France, Spain and Romania) or 
countries that impose notable restrictions at the establishment phase but are much less 
restrictive when it comes to the operations phase (e.g. Sweden and Slovenia).   
Eighth, the robustness analysis suggests that the choice of a non-compensatory versus 
a fully compensatory approach (as currently done) for aggregating the indicators within 
each RRI pillar would impact six countries in the case of the establishment restrictions 
and nine countries in the case of the operations restrictions. Yet, the high degree of 
association between the country orderings obtained using either the arithmetic 
average (baseline) versus a non-compensatory approach is reassuring. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of uncertainty in both pillars is modest when altering the 
weights within reasonable limits (+/- 25% around the expert-based weights): country 
scores change less than plus/minus 0.2 points on the 0-6 scale for the Establishment 
restrictions and less than 0.3 points for the Operations restrictions. 
Readers of the SWD on the Retail Restrictiveness Indicator should hence go beyond the 
overall index scores and duly take into account the individual indicators and pillars on 
their own merit. By doing so, country-specific strengths and challenges in regulating the 
retail sector can be identified and serve as an input for data-informed policy analysis. The 
Retail Restrictiveness Indicator should not be seen as the ultimate and definitive 
yardstick of EU countries regulatory frameworks. Instead, the RRI best represents an 
ongoing attempt by the Commission services to help focus the policy discussions on 
selected types of restrictions that matter for the EU, continuously adapting the RRI 
framework to reflect the improved availability of statistics and the theoretical advances in 
the field.  
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